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I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Colosimo, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an
expectation of privacy does not exist in a boat or other conveyance
typically used to transport fish and it is therefore permissible for an
armed conservation officer to conduct a nonconsensual inspection
1
of the boat or other conveyance. In making its decision, the court
relied upon Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3),
† Ed Butterfoss and Joseph Daly are professors of Law at Hamline
University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. They represented John Colosimo in
his petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The authors
wish to thank Michele Satterlund, a third year student at Hamline Law School, for
her assistance and hard work.
1. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
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which provides that a person may not “refuse to allow inspection of
a motor vehicle, boat or other conveyance used while taking or
2
transporting wild animals.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision authorizes searches
of individuals absent any suspicion of criminal behavior or behavior
3
in violation of state fishing regulations.
By eliminating any
requirement of suspicion of wrongdoing, the court allows searches
based on an armed conservation officer’s whim, rather than a
suspicion that an individual has engaged in conduct that violates
4
Minnesota’s fishing and hunting laws.
The decision permits
searches based solely on a suspicion that an individual has been
5
engaged in the lawful activity of fishing and/or transporting fish,
opening the door to searches at the unbridled discretion of
individual officers.
The court’s decision is inconsistent with the Fourth
6
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
7
and with the court’s own recent decision in State v. Larsen, which
prohibited the search of a fish house by an officer who lacked
8
probable cause. Additionally, in State v. Henning, the court “took a
firm stance in favor of the ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’
standard . . . [and] made it clear that constitutional rules apply
even during stops of vehicles with special series plates . . . issued
9
chiefly to repeat drunken drivers.”
This article examines the various opinions in the Colosimo case,
including the opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals (which
was reversed by the supreme court), as well as the majority,
10
concurring, and dissenting opinions of the supreme court. The
article provides a brief background of how the issue of stops and
inspections by conservation officers has been dealt with in other
11
jurisdictions before turning to a critique of the Minnesota
2. MINN. STAT. § 97A.251 subd. 1(3) (2000) (including fish in the definition
of wild animal).
3. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 9.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. 650 N.W.2d 144, 153–54 (Minn. 2002).
8. 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003).
9. Piper Kenney Webb & Bruce H. Hanley, Scarlet Letters: Traffic Stops Based
on ‘Special’ License Plates Must Follow The Letter of The Constitution—State v. Henning,
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 513, 528 (2003) (citing Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379).
10. See infra Parts III, IV.
11. See infra Part V.A.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Colosimo, which the authors consider
12
far too expansive. The decision in Colosimo undermines the right
of citizens of Minnesota to be free from invasions of privacy at the
unbridled discretion of officers in the field. The court historically
has recognized and protected this right, but Colosimo, to paraphrase
the court in Henning, represents “a dramatic departure that
demotes constitutional protections to a position inferior to that of
13
fishing regulations.”
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
On the morning of September 18, 2000, John Colosimo was
ending a fishing trip with a law school friend and the friend’s two
adult children on Rainy Lake at Kettle Falls in Voyageurs National
14
Park.
The group had stowed their personal belongings and
suitcases on Colosimo’s open bowed boat in order to make the trip
back to the far shore of Lake Namakan where they had left their
15
vehicles.
The Crestliner boat, owned by Colosimo, was being trailered
by a truck owned by a National Park licensee along the National
16
Park roadway between Rainy Lake and Namakan Lake. As the
truck and trailered boat made a loop on the National Park roadway
to allow the driver to back the trailer and boat into the water of
Namakan Lake, the occupants of the boat observed another
unmarked boat tied by its bow to the dock adjacent to the boat
17
ramp.
It was a boat used by the Department of Natural
18
Once the truck operator had stopped the truck to
Resources.
unhook the Crestliner, Officer Lloyd Stein, a uniformed Minnesota
19
Department of Resources officer, walked toward the truck. He
struck up a conversation with Colosimo, who was sitting at the

12. See infra Part V.B.
13. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 386.
14. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
15. Id.; John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 3 (on file with author).
16. See John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 3 (on file with author).
17. Id.
18. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3.
19. Id.
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20

steering wheel of his boat.
Officer Stein asked Colosimo if his group had caught any fish,
21
and Colosimo responded that they had caught some. Colosimo
told Stein that they were in a hurry to go because of mechanical
22
problems with his friend’s new boat. Stein asked how many fish
23
the group had caught. Colosimo responded that they had not
24
been fishing that day and had less then their limit. Stein asked
how they had the fish packaged, and Colosimo responded they had
gutted and gilled the fish according to the regulations affecting
25
26
Rainy Lake.
Stein asked if he could take a look at the fish.
Colosimo inquired as to why they were being questioned and asked
Stein several times what his basis was for searching and inspecting
the fish, what his probable cause was, and whether he had a search
27
warrant. Colosimo told Stein he would agree to a search if the
officer could articulate legitimate and valid reasons to search the
28
boat.
Officer Stein stated that he didn’t need a reason as long as he
29
knew there were fish on the boat.
When Colosimo refused
inspection, the conservation officer issued Colosimo a ticket for
failing to allow an inspection of his boat pursuant to Minnesota
30
Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3).
B. Procedural History
The State and Mr. Colosimo agreed to a bench trial, and the
district court found Colosimo guilty of refusal to allow inspection of

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. John M. Colosimo Aff. ¶ 2 (on file with author).
23. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d 271, 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 669
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 2017 (2004).
29. Id. Colosimo did not have any improperly obtained fish on the boat. The
fish on the boat had been obtained pursuant to proper permits and gutted and
gilled according to regulation. Colosimo was not attempting to hide incriminating
evidence from the conservation officer. Colosimo’s refusal was based on the fact
that Officer Stein did not have a search warrant and did not provide Colosimo
with probable cause for searching the boat and inspecting the fish. See John M.
Colosimo Aff. (on file with author).
30. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 272.
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a boat under Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251, subdivision
31
32
1(3). He was assessed a fine of $100.00 plus a $37.00 surcharge.
Colosimo appealed the conviction to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. The court of appeals, in an opinion authored by now
33
34
Justice Sam Hanson, reversed the district court. The court of
appeals concluded that in order to inspect Colosimo’s boat the
officer must have probable cause of a violation of a fish or game
35
law. The court further held that a boat owner’s refusal to allow an
inspection does not provide probable cause to believe the owner
36
has incriminating evidence of fish violations on the boat.
The State appealed the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
Colosimo had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of
his open boat or other conveyance used to typically store or
37
transport fish.
The court held that it was permissible for the
conservation officer to conduct a nonconsensual inspection of the
area of Colosimo’s open boat, including areas where fish are
38
typically stored or transported. The court found that by refusing
to submit to the officer’s request to inspect all these areas of his
open boat, Colosimo had violated Minnesota Statutes section
39
97A.251, subdivision 1(3).
Following the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision, a petition for writ of certiorari was made to the
United States Supreme Court. The writ was denied on April 19,
40
2004.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The court of appeals first addressed “whether the state must
prove, as a predicate to the crime of refusal to allow inspection,
that the [conservation] officer had probable cause to request the

31. Id.
32. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3.
33. Justice Hanson was later appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but
based on his participation in the decision of the court of appeals, he recused
himself when the Supreme Court heard the case.
34. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d 271.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Colosimo v. Minnesota, 124 S. Ct. 2017 (2004).
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41

inspection.” Although Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251 does
not expressly include that requirement, the court concluded that
“it must be implied because of constitutional and other statutory
42
requirements.”
The court noted that the “Minnesota Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches made by
43
The court of appeals also stated that a
conservation officers.”
“conservation officer violate[s] the Fourth Amendment when he
enter[s] . . . [a] fish house without consent, a warrant, probable
44
cause or any articulable basis for suspicion.” The court concluded
that a person in an automobile has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and saw no reason to distinguish between an automobile
45
and a boat.
According to the court this was especially true in
Colosimo, where the boat was towed by a motor vehicle, further
46
blurring any distinction between a vehicle and a boat. Under the
Fourth Amendment—assuming there is no distinction between a
boat and a motor vehicle—a conservation officer is required to
have probable cause that a crime has been committed in order to
47
justify a search of a boat without the owner’s consent. That being
so, the court posed the question whether “the legislature [could]
constitutionally require a person to consent to a warrantless search
of protected property without probable cause, or make it a crime
48
for a person to refuse such consent?”
Although the narrow
49
wording of the statute appeared to require such consent, the
court concluded that in order to be consistent with the
constitution, it must read the statute to include an implied
predicate that the officer have probable cause to support a request
50
for inspection.
The court supported its conclusion by pointing to a related
statute, which states, “[w]hen an enforcement officer has probable
cause to believe that wild animals taken or possessed in violation of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 274 n.1.
See id. at 274.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000).
Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 274.
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game and fish laws are present, the officer may: (1) enter and
inspect any place or vehicle; and (2) open and inspect any package
51
or container.” By construing the provisions of the crime of refusal
to allow inspection together with the probable cause limitations
placed on the officer’s authority to inspect, the court concluded
that a boat owner could not be convicted of the crime of refusing
an inspection unless the state could prove the officer had probable
cause to request the inspection.
The appellate court also rejected the state’s contention that
probable cause was not required for an inspection because of the
52
“regulated activity exception” to the Fourth Amendment.
The
court pointed to State v. Krenz, which held that warrantless searches
conducted to enforce regulatory schemes are only enforceable in
the context of a pervasively regulated business activity, not a
53
personal recreational activity.
Just as Krenz rejected the
application of the exception to a fish house used for personal
recreational purposes, the Colosimo court ruled that “unless a
person is using a boat for a pervasively regulated business activity,
54
probable cause is required to enter and inspect a boat.”
The
court acknowledged “the difficulty a conservation officer faces in
acquiring probable cause for fishing violations that are committed
essentially in private,” but emphasized that the difficulty of finding
probable cause does not override constitutional protections or
55
statutory limitations. Further, the court could not conclude that
“the legislature had clearly expressed an intent to prefer the
56
enforcement of the fish laws to individual privacy rights.”
The court cited State v. Greyeagle, which held that a statute
regulating the issuance of special series license plates to cars
registered to convicted DUI offenders (or members of their
household) did not expressly authorize vehicle stops based solely
57
on the license plates. Additionally, a driver who displays special
series license plates does not give implied consent to stop the
vehicle on which the plates are displayed, absent reasonable

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1995)).

Id. at 276.
Id. at 275.
Id. (citing State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 236–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. Ct. App.
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58

suspicion independent of the special plates.
Only after the
legislature amended the statute to provide specific authorization
for stops based solely on the plates did the court of appeals
construe the statute to establish a driver’s implied consent without
59
independent suspicion.
The Colosimo court contrasted that
situation with Minnesota Statutes section 97A.215, which
“conditions the officer’s inspection authority to situations where
60
the officer has ‘probable cause.’”
The final issue the appellate court decided was whether
Colosimo’s refusal to allow an inspection, together with the
officer’s knowledge that fish were in the boat, gave the officer
61
probable cause to believe Colosimo had violated fishing laws. The
court held that Colosimo’s refusal did not give the conservation
officer probable cause to believe Colosimo had incriminating
evidence on the boat because the Fourth Amendment provides “‘a
constitutional right to refuse to consent to entry and search,’ where
62
the officer lacks probable cause,” and because passive refusal
63
cannot be a crime, nor be used as evidence of a crime. The court
observed to hold otherwise would effectively eliminate the
requirement of probable cause because an officer could avoid the
requirement by simply requesting inspection: if the boat owner
64
refused, the officer could use the refusal as probable cause. The
appellate court concluded that because the conservation officer
admitted he did not have probable cause when he initially
approached the boat and Colosimo’s refusal could not provide
probable cause, Colosimo could not be convicted for refusing to
65
allow inspection.

58. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d at 330.
59. Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 275–76 (citing State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500,
503 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003)). See also, infra
notes 177–87 and accompanying text.
60. 648 N.W.2d at 276.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (9th Cir.
1978)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Colosimo argued
that the Department of Natural Resources officer “stopped” his
fishing party without reasonable suspicion in violation of the
66
Fourth Amendment. He further argued that because the officer
did not have probable cause to inspect his boat, the officer’s
request to do so was unlawful and Colosimo could not be convicted
67
for his refusal to permit the inspection.
Colosimo relied on
Delaware v. Prouse, which held that the Fourth Amendment
68
prohibits random and suspicionless stops of drivers.
The majority began its analysis by determining that the
conservation officer’s approach and subsequent questioning of
Colosimo about the group’s fishing activities did not constitute a
“stop” under the Fourth Amendment, an issue the court of appeals
had expressly declined to address because it was not necessary to its
69
decision. The supreme court pointed out that the conservation
officer had simply conversed with Colosimo while the boat was at a
70
standstill prior to its entering the lake. This, the court reasoned,
presented a situation distinctly different from that of Prouse, where
71
a patrol officer stopped a moving automobile without cause. The
court relied on previous cases holding that generally no seizure
occurs when an officer approaches and asks questions of a person
72
standing on a public street or sitting in a parked car. The court
acknowledged that a seizure eventually took place, but concluded
that, by that point, Colosimo had admitted to fishing and
transporting fish but refused to allow an inspection, thus giving the
conservation officer the suspicion required under the Fourth

66. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
67. See id. at 3-5.
68. Id. at 4 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
69. See Colosimo, 648 N.W.2d at 276.
70. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing In re Matter of Welfare of E.D.J, 502 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn.
1993); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1980)). On the issue of
difficulty in determining when a seizure occurs, see generally Edwin J. Butterfoss,
Bright Line Seizures: The Need For Clarity In Determining When Fourth Amendment
Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988).
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73

Amendment.
The court then considered whether the conservation officer
had the authority to search Colosimo’s open boat to inspect fish
74
once Colosimo had admitted to transporting fish.
The issue
turned on whether, under the circumstances, Colosimo had a
75
reasonable expectation of privacy.
If not, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches” would not
be implicated and his conviction for refusing to allow the search
76
would be lawful.
The court framed the issue as a question
“whether there are any areas of Colosimo’s boat where an
77
expectation of privacy was not reasonable . . . .”
To determine whether Colosimo’s expectation of privacy was
reasonable, the court considered the nature of recreational fishing,
the characteristics of an open boat, and the fact that the request
78
occurred in open season near game fish habitat.
The court
described recreational fishing as a highly regulated and licensed
privilege that imposes strict conditions on those who choose to
79
participate in the sport.
One of those conditions, the court
concluded, is allowing conservation officers to inspect boats or
80
other conveyances used to transport fish.
The court found guidance in the Montana Supreme Court
81
decision in State v. Boyer.
Boyer held that a fisherman had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the rear platform of his boat,
and held that a park warden could legally step on the transom of
82
the boat to inspect fish contained in the live well. The court in
Boyer explained:
In engaging in this highly regulated activity, anglers must
assume the burdens of the sport as well as its benefits.
Thus, no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
exists when a wildlife enforcement officer checks for
73. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 3. Of course, that admission by Colosimo was not
an admission of wrongdoing or behavior in violation of fishing regulations. Thus,
the court ultimately authorized a seizure and search without suspicion of any
wrongdoing.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002).
82. Id. at 779.
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hunting and fishing licenses in open season near a game
habitat, inquires about game taken, and requests to
inspect game in the field. In this capacity, game wardens
are acting not only as law enforcement officers, but as
public trustees protecting and conserving Montana’s
83
wildlife and habitat for all its citizens.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted the important role
fishing plays in the lives of many Minnesotans and the need for
84
The court
regulations to protect the state’s natural resources.
concluded that the citizens of Minnesota understand the need for
effective regulation, as evidenced by the fact that they have adopted
an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution which states,
“Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued
part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people
85
and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good.”
This provision, the court concluded, recognizes the link between
the enforcement of fishing regulations and the preservation of
86
Minnesota’s game and fish resources.
The court noted that when anglers purchase fishing licenses,
they routinely receive pamphlets relating to fishing limitations and
87
regulations.
This information, together with the “widespread
knowledge of the restrictions accompanying the privilege of fishing
casts doubt on the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy that
would allow an angler to refuse inspection of his catch. Those who
. . . harvest Minnesota’s natural game are on notice . . . [and] are
88
subject to regulations.” Thus, the court reasoned, Colosimo, who
was at a known fishing destination, acknowledged he had been
fishing, and admitted to transporting his catch in an open boat
“had no reasonable expectation of privacy [in] the areas of his
open boat or other conveyance used to typically store or transport
89
fish . . . .”
The court supported its reasoning by citing other courts
around the country that have reached similar conclusions when
90
analyzing searches of individuals who choose to take game. They
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 776.
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6.
Id. (citing MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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noted that in People v. Perez, the California Court of Appeals held
that “the high degree of regulation over the privilege of hunting, in
91
turn, reduces a hunter’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” In
Hamilton v. Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that “[e]veryone who
participates in the privilege of hunting has a duty to permit
inspections to determine whether they are complying with
92
applicable laws.” And the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v.
Halverson held that “[s]ince it is a privilege to hunt wild game, a
hunter tacitly consents to the inspection of any game animal in his
possession when he makes application for and receives a hunting
93
license.” In citing these cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court did
not address the dissent’s arguments that these cases involved either
searches that occurred in plain view—as opposed to the closed
containers in Colosimo’s case—or checkpoint searches, which are
94
not permissible under the Minnesota Constitution.
The court also insisted that its decision was consistent with
State v. Larsen, which recognized citizens’ expectation of privacy in
a fish house and prohibited the search of a fish house without
95
probable cause. A fish house, the court observed, is a “home-like
96
dwelling” that provides “privacy for activities ‘recognized and
97
permitted by society,’” and “the minimal intrusion involved [with
inspecting fish on a boat] . . . is markedly less than that occurring
98
The court explained that any other
[in a] . . . fish house.”
conclusion “would prevent the state from meeting its constitutional
mandate [to] manage and regulate fishing to preserve [the state’s]
natural resources” because “the state would only be able to inspect
boats when it [had] observe[d] or ha[d] information from a
‘confidential reliable informant’ on the actual catching and
keeping of fish in excess of the applicable limits, size, season, or
99
species.” To the court, “[t]he idea that officers would be required
to personally witness illegal catch activity, coupled with the reality
that fishing can take hours or even days, illustrates how absurd it

91.
1996)).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. (quoting People v. Perez, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App.
281 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2002).
277 N.W.2d 723, 724–25 (S.D. 1979).
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 12 nn.3–4.
Id. at 6–7 (citing State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 2002)).
Id. at 7.
Id. (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 149).
Id.
Id.
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would be to recognize a privacy interest inherent in an angler’s
100
take and only then have probable cause to inspect.”
To support its argument, the court again pointed to the
101
reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Boyer.
Boyer
recognized that “Montana’s vast geography, the angler’s somewhat
uninhibited freedom of movement, and remoteness from warrantissuing magistrates and law enforcement entities would severely
impede game violation investigations,” leading to the “depletion of
102
Montana’s wildlife and fish.”
The Colosimo court compared
Minnesota’s more than 10,000 lakes and numerous streams and
rivers to Montana’s rugged geography and concluded that
Minnesota’s anglers’ “largely uninhibited freedom of movement in
remote areas in pursuit of . . . abundant fish” similarly impeded
game violation investigations in Minnesota, putting the state’s
103
natural resources at risk.
Having determined that the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit a limited inspection of Colosimo’s
boat, the court lastly turned to the issue of whether the statute
under which Colosimo was convicted required probable cause in
104
order to undertake a search.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of
appeals’ interpretation of the statute, which required proof, “as a
predicate to the crime of refusal to allow inspection,” that an
105
officer have probable cause to suspect a violation.
The supreme
court relied on the plain wording of the statute and declined “to
interject a probable cause requirement into [section] 97A.251
merely because the legislature in [section] 97A.215[, subdivision]
1(b)(1) granted conservation officers with probable cause the
106
authority to ‘enter and inspect any place or vehicle.’”
In conclusion, the court stressed that their decision did “not
grant conservation officers power beyond that of other law
107
enforcement officers.” Rather, the court argued, “the difference
between the inspection permitted under the facts of this case and
searches impermissible under the Fourth Amendment is that
fishing is a largely recreational privilege that anglers choose to
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002).
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Boyer, 42 P.3d at 776).
Id. at 8.
Id. (referring to MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 9 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b)(1)).
Id.
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engage in with knowledge of the regulations governing their
108
The decision, the court reasoned, “merely
conduct.”
acknowledges that an expectation of privacy in all parts of an open
boat or other conveyance used to transport fish is not
109
reasonable.”
As such, the court concluded that “it was
permissible for the conservation officer to conduct a
nonconsensual inspection of the areas of Colosimo’s open boat
typically used to store or transport fish,” and by failing to submit to
the officer’s lawful request, Colosimo violated Minnesota Statutes
110
section 97A.251, subdivision 1(3).
B. Justice Page’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Page, in his dissent, decried the loss of the historic
protection for an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches: “Today’s sweeping decision holding that there is no
expectation of privacy in areas of an open boat where fish are
typically stored overturns recent precedent and eviscerates the
111
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches.”
Justice Page’s dissent begins with the acknowledgment that, as
a general rule, a state has the power to grant or deny a privilege as
112
the state sees fit. However, Justice Page pointed out, the power of
the state is not unlimited and it may not impose conditions that
113
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.
The
majority’s decision in Colosimo, Justice Page argued, “permits
precisely that which the Supreme Court in Frost prohibited”—
imposing a condition on the privilege of taking wildlife, which
114
infringes on constitutional rights. As a result, Justice Page argued
that the court has subjected Minnesota’s citizens to searches at the
whim of individual officers:
By concluding that one who engages in the regulated
activity of fishing has no expectation of privacy in the
areas of an open boat or other conveyance used to

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 9 (Page, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 9–10 (“[T]he state may not impose upon the permission to take
wildlife the condition that the state be allowed to invade the constitutional rights
of the individual.”).
114. Id. at 10 (referring to Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926)).
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typically transport or store fish, the court ensures that
every such search will be reasonable, even when based on
a conservation officer’s whim, thereby making a warrant
based on probable cause unnecessary. In the end,
because no such warrantless searches will be violative of
the Fourth Amendment’s and article I, section 10’s,
protections against unreasonable searches, individuals
engaging in or who are believed to have engaged in
hunting or fishing will be subject to searches otherwise
115
constitutionally forbidden.
According to Justice Page, the erosion of citizens’ protection is
exacerbated by the court’s refusal to define or explain what
constitutes an area “of an open boat or other conveyance used to
116
Justice Page conceded that “to
typically store or transport fish.”
the extent a boat is open and items are in plain view, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in those items because the
117
individual has not sought to keep them private.”
The problem,
he pointed out, “is that the court extends this rationale to any place
on the boat where fish are typically stored and to items not in plain
118
view.”
He explained, “[t]he expansive language in the opinion
makes it apparent that a peace officer . . . will be able to search not
only open boats, but any boat, car, or truck on the mere hunch that
the occupants have engaged in the regulated activity of hunting or
119
fishing.” In failing to define these areas, Justice Page argued, the
court opened the door to searches of packages and containers on a
120
boat that contains items an individual is seeking to keep private.
Justice Page rejected the court’s conclusion that Colosimo had
no expectation of privacy because recreational fishing is a privilege
121
and subject to extensive regulation.
He argued that the court’s
122
123
reliance on People v. Perez and State v. Halverson is misplaced,
since those cases involved searches that arose out of game
checkpoints, a law enforcement procedure that is impermissible
124
under the Minnesota Constitution.
Further, he noted that the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 10 n.1.
Id. at 12 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 10 n.1.
Id. at 12 n.3.
Id. at 9–18.
59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979).
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 12 (Page, J., dissenting).
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court in Larsen concluded that fishing is not comparable to
“running an automobile junkyard business, operating a licensed
gun dealership, or engaging in the sale of alcoholic beverages for
125
the purpose of the closely regulated industry exception.”
Larsen
recognized that the state’s fish and game rules were no more
comprehensive than the state’s traffic rules, and concluded that the
state’s interest in protecting and regulating wildlife and natural
126
resources was less than its interest in deterring drunk driving.
Therefore, a fishing boat—particularly one not in the water—at a
minimum is entitled to the same protection as an automobile. “If,
in the face of extensive regulation, the search of a vehicle may ‘not
be initiated without at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of
unlawful conduct,’ then the search of a fishing boat should not be
127
treated any differently.”
As to the statute under which Colosimo was convicted, Justice
Page asserted that the presumption that the legislature did not
intend an absurd or unreasonable result, and that the legislature
intended the entire statute to be effective and certain, compels a
128
different result.
Here, Minnesota Statutes section 97A.251,
subdivision 1(3), provides that a person may not “refuse to allow
inspection of a motor vehicle, boat, or other conveyance used while
129
taking or transporting wild animals.”
However, Minnesota
Statutes section 97A.215, subdivision 1(b), authorizes conservation
officers to “enter and inspect any place or vehicle” and to “open
and inspect any package or container” only when the officer “has
probable cause to believe that wild animals taken or possessed in
130
violation of the game and fish laws are present.”
Although the
majority refused to impose a probable cause requirement on the
inspections for which citizens can be punished for refusing “merely
because” the legislature required officers to have probable cause
before carrying out the inspection, Justice Page contended that
reading the provisions together compels the conclusion that a
citizen need only accede to an invitation if the officer has the
131
authority to inspect—that is, probable cause.
The majority’s

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. (quoting State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 152–53 (Minn. 2002)).
Id. at 13; see Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153.
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 13 (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153).
Id. at 16.
MINN. STAT. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3) (2000).
Id. § 97A.251 subd. 1(b).
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 16.
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interpretation produces an absurd result. “The enforcement
officer cannot conduct an inspection without probable cause,” but
a person can be criminally penalized for refusing to allow an
inspection that the enforcement officer had no authority to
132
conduct in the first place.
Justice Page acknowledged that a probable cause requirement
will make it more difficult to detect fishing violations, but noted,
“as we concluded in Larsen, the ‘ease in enforcing the law has never
133
been a sufficient justification for government intrusion.’”
In
addition, although the majority claimed that a probable cause
requirement “would prevent the state from meeting its
constitutional mandate that it manage and regulate fishing to
preserve our natural resources,” the State offered no evidence to
134
In
show that this was the only effective enforcement measure.
fact, the State conceded that requiring conservation officers to
comply with the constitutional requirements of probable cause
“does not pose any kind of direct threat to fish, per se,” and the
“resource itself can be protected even if individual harvest
135
behaviors cannot be regulated.”
Justice Page contended that
“[w]ithout empirical evidence to the contrary, there is no way to
reach the conclusion that the random seizure of an individual on
the mere belief that the individual has engaged in . . . fishing or
gaming is . . . an effective [or justifiable] means of promoting
136
resource preservation.”
Justice Page was also concerned that the court, rather than
requiring the state to properly manage Minnesota’s wildlife
resources, “has instead decided to grant the state the power to
compel the relinquishment of an individual’s constitutional right
not only to be free from unreasonable searches, but also the
freedom to assert one’s constitutional right without fear of criminal
137
punishment.”
He was worried that the court’s decision holding that there is
no expectation of privacy in areas of an open boat where fish are
typically stored overturns recent precedent and eviscerates the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches:

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 17 (quoting Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 150 n.5).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
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Because both conservation officers and police officers are
bound as peace officers by the same constitutional
constraints, the court’s decision has now opened the door
for warrantless searches by any peace officer upon the
mere suspicion that an individual is, has been, or will in
the future engage in hunting or fishing. As the Court said
in Frost, “It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in
the Constitution . . . may thus be manipulated out of
138
existence.”
C. Justice Paul Anderson’s Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Paul Anderson concurred with the majority’s
conclusion that the conservation officer had the right to inspect
the open sections of Colosimo’s fishing boat and that Colosimo
139
prevented the conservation officer from doing so.
Justice
Anderson argued, however, that the court’s analysis went beyond
what was necessary by granting the officer the right to inspect “any
140
other conveyance” used to transport fish.
He agreed with the
majority that Colosimo, as an angler in a stopped, open boat who
admitted to fishing, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the open section of his boat, even though it would be intrusive to
141
some degree to have an officer look in his boat. His concern was
that the majority’s express holding that the officer could also
search “any other conveyance” used to transport fish was overly
142
broad, unnecessary, and inadvisable.
He noted that because the
conservation officer in Colosimo was prevented from any search, it
is unknown what “other conveyance,” if any, the conservation
143
officer sought to inspect.
The court’s vague holding that
conveyances “used to typically store or transport fish” are subject to
search makes it difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty
144
what other conveyances are subject to search.
Presumably
because “other conveyances” potentially includes areas with
significant expectations of privacy, Justice Anderson would have left
the resolution of what a conservation officer has the right to

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 18 (quoting Frost v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926)).
Id. (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inspect beyond the open sections of a fisherman’s boat for another
145
day.
V. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of an open boat or
other conveyance typically used to transport fish, making such
areas subject to inspection without individualized suspicion, is
contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the privilege of
fishing is important, the rights of citizenship are vital, and a
constitutional right must outweigh a broad, unlimited right of
inspection by an officer. No citizen should be criminally punished
for refusing to consent to an unrestrained, suspicionless search.
A. Background
In his concurring opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that in his view the case did not address the
constitutionality of “the necessarily somewhat individualized and
perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the
146
performance of their duties.”
Since then, although never
addressed by the United States Supreme Court, numerous state
and lower federal courts have addressed the issue. Generally, these
courts have recognized the important government interest in
protecting the natural resources of their respective states, but they
have imposed limits on the actions of game wardens in order to
protect citizens from indiscriminate searches and seizures
undertaken at the whim of individual officers.
Several courts have permitted searches or seizures if the officer
has reasonable suspicion that a violation of fish and game laws has
occurred. For example, in People v. Coca, the Colorado Supreme
Court required reasonable suspicion of illegal behavior before
147
stopping a vehicle.
In Hill v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
permitted an officer to board a ship to view a shrimping permit,
but required probable cause of a violation before an inspection of
148
the boat could take place. The Illinois Court of Appeals, in People
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
829 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1992).
238 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1970).
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v. Levens, held that a motorist may only be stopped if an officer has
reasonable suspicion that the motorist is presently engaged in
149
illegal hunting. Also, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v.
150
151
Creech and the West Virginia Supreme Court in State v. Legg
both held that reasonable suspicion was required for a stop by a
conservation officer.
A few courts, however, have permitted suspicionless stops and
searches. In State v. Keehner, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted
stops of vehicles of individuals “engaged in an activity which may be
152
reasonably interpreted as ‘hunting.’”
And the Sixth Circuit in
Hamilton v. Myers upheld the right of game wardens to make
inspections and conduct searches without warrants when it is clear
153
that someone has been hunting.
Consistent with Prouse, several courts have permitted
suspicionless searches only if a scheme is in place to limit the
discretion of the officer in the field. In People v. Perez, the
California Court of Appeals allowed the use of traffic checkpoints
near hunting areas during hunting season in order to inspect
154
licenses, tags, equipment and any wildlife taken.
Similarly, the
155
South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Halverson, and the
156
Mississippi Supreme Court in Drane v. State, upheld checkpoints
used in search of wildlife and game violations.
B. An Overly Broad Rule
By holding that Colosimo did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the “areas of an open boat or other
157
conveyance used to typically store or transport fish” and thus
could be criminally punished for refusing to permit inspection, the
Minnesota Supreme Court improperly stripped Colosimo of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. This placed an impermissible
burden on the right to assert one’s constitutional rights without

149. 713 N.E.2d 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
150. 806 P.2d 1080 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
151. 536 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 2000).
152. 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988).
153. 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002).
154. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
155. 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979).
156. 493 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1986).
157. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
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fear of criminal punishment.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that citizens enjoy an expectation of privacy in containers found
within a vehicle. In United States v. Ross, the Court concluded that
“the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every
158
container that conceals its contents from plain view.”
In
upholding a suspicionless boarding of a vessel in waters providing
access to the open sea in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the
Court emphasized the fact that “[n]either the [vessel] nor its
occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the [vessel] is
159
limited to what can be seen without a search.”
To the extent that a boat is open and items are in plain view,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those items
because the individual has not sought to keep them private. The
problem with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Colosimo
is that its holding extends to any place where fish are typically
stored, including those items not in plain view. The Minnesota
Supreme Court did not specifically delineate the limits of a legal
search of an open boat, but nevertheless permitted a search of
160
areas used “to typically store or transport fish.”
This necessarily
includes those areas not in plain view and presumably includes
161
containers, which are often used to transport fish. In fact, in the
Colosimo case, Colosimo told the conservation officer that the party
was transporting fish “gutted and gilled . . . in accordance with the
162
regulations affecting Rainy Lake.” Thus the fish were likely to be
found in closed containers. By permitting suspicionless searches of
closed containers, the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the
authority of conservation officers beyond justification. The court’s
holding in this regard exceeds the holding and rationale of State v.
163
Boyer, a case on which the court so heavily relied.
In Boyer, the Montana Supreme Court was careful to justify the
seizure of defendant as based on reasonable suspicion that an

158. 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981)).
159. 462 U.S. 579, 592 (1983) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 558 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
160. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 6.
161. The majority cited to Webster’s International Dictionary which defined
“conveyance” as “[a] means of carrying or transporting something.” Id. at 8 n.2
(citing WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 499 (3d ed. 1993)).
162. Id. at 3.
163. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002).
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offense had occurred, noting that “[i]t is the presence of
reasonable suspicion that allowed [the game warden] to proceed
164
with the investigative stop.”
The Montana court was further
careful to limit the intrusion onto the boat to the transom, an area
it equated to the bumper of a vehicle, in which the court found the
165
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Finally, the
Montana court justified the officer looking into the live well as
plain view. The court emphasized the importance of the fact that
the officer “did not conduct a search of the boat, look under the
seats, remove or rearrange any personal belongings, or even open
166
the top of the live well.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, failed to recognize
the importance of this limitation. In the court’s view, because at
least some portion of the boat was subject to search, Colosimo was
guilty of a crime by refusing any search. But how was Colosimo to
know the search demanded by the conservation officer would be
limited to lawful areas? There was no search warrant describing the
places to be searched; there were no administrative regulations or
guidelines in place to limit the search; and, under the court’s
ruling, probable cause did not limit or define the scope of the
search. The limit the court articulated in its opinion—areas of the
open boat typically used to store or transport fish—was created by
the court and was not in place at the time of the demand to search
that led to Colosimo’s criminal conviction.
Mr. Colosimo was faced with a demand for a broad, unlimited
search of the trailered boat in which he was traveling and the
containers on that boat, and was criminally punished for refusing
to consent to such a search. This is precisely the type of
“standardless and unconstrained discretion” by the officer in the
field that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against
167
and that Delaware v. Prouse sought to prevent. If Minnesota seeks
to utilize suspicionless searches to enforce its hunting and fishing
laws, the Fourth Amendment at a minimum requires that such
searches be appropriately limited by statute, regulation, or
administrative policy.

164. Id. at 777.
165. Id. at 778.
166. Id. at 780.
167. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523,
532–33 (1967)).
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C. The Balance Between Environmental and Individual Rights
Fishing plays an important role in the lives of many Minnesota
citizens. With its 10,000 lakes and plentiful streams and rivers,
Minnesota is a haven of natural resources for sport fishing
enthusiasts. The State, to ensure the protection of this natural
resource, created statutes and regulations that limit certain aspects
of the sport, such as quantity, season, species, location, and size.
These regulations help protect the resource so it can be enjoyed by
countless generations to come.
In its attempt to protect the state’s natural resources, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has issued a decision that goes far
beyond commonly recognized regulations and violates the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The court’s decision that boats used in fishing are
subject to indiscriminate searches at the whim of conservation
officers is contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and contradicts the Minnesota Supreme Court’s own recent
precedent. In State v. Larsen, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a fish house, although not a substitute for a private dwelling,
168
provides citizens with a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The
fish house, the court reasoned, protected its occupants from the
elements and often provided eating, sleeping, and other facilities,
thus providing privacy for activities “recognized and permitted by
169
society” as important activities of a personal nature.
In Colosimo, the court justified its decision not to provide
citizens in boats the same protection as occupants of a fish house
because “the minimal intrusion involved here is markedly less than
that occurring when the privacy of the private, home-like dwelling
170
of a fish house is invaded.”
Putting aside the difficult questions
the court will face when a conservation officer attempts to search a
houseboat he believes may contain fish, the court’s conclusion that
the state’s interest in regulating fishing outweighs the intrusion
involved in the search of a boat is difficult to square with the
previous treatment it has accorded motor vehicles. Perhaps a fish
house deserves greater protection than a boat, but why should
citizens in a boat (or in a car pulling a boat) receive less protection

168. 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002).
169. Id.
170. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
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than citizens in a car?
In Larsen, the court asserted that the state’s fish and game
rules and regulations were “no more pervasive or comprehensive
171
than the state’s traffic rules and regulations.”
It concluded that
the state’s interest in protecting and regulating wildlife was less
than its interest in deterring drunk driving, which previous cases
had concluded did not outweigh the privacy expectations of a
172
That being the case, it is anomalous
motor vehicle occupant.
that, according to the Colosimo court, the state’s interest in
protecting and regulating wildlife outweighs the privacy
expectations of the occupant of a boat.
In Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court exercised its
independent authority to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to
strike down the use of roadblocks to stop all vehicles at sobriety
173
checkpoints.
The court pointed out that it “ha[d] long held
[that Minnesota Constitution article I, section 10] generally
requires the police to have an objective individualized articulable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an
174
investigative stop.”
Because the court believed the state had
failed to articulate a persuasive reason for dispensing with the
requirement of individualized suspicion, the court concluded that
“the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting
the traveling public from even the ‘minimally intrusive’ seizures
175
which occur at a sobriety checkpoint.”
That being so, the
constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting boat
occupants from the intrusion of a search—even one characterized
as a “minimal intrusion”—if the countervailing state interest is
protection and regulation of fish and wildlife, which the court has
found less weighty than the interest in deterring drunk driving.
In State v. Henning, the court again protected occupants of cars
when faced with the issue of whether police could stop individuals
based solely on the basis of special series license plates issued for
cars registered to individuals (or members of their household)
176
whose license has been revoked as a result of DUI convictions.

171.
172.
1994)).
173.
174.
175.
176.

Larsen, 650 N.W.2d at 153.
Id. (relying on Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn.
519 N.W.2d 183.
Id. at 187.
Id.
666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003).
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The court relied on Delaware v. Prouse for the proposition that
where individualized suspicion is not required to make a stop,
other safeguards must be present to assure that a driver’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is not invaded at the unbridled
177
discretion of a patrolling officer. The court complained that the
statute at issue in Henning “seeks to eliminate the constitutional
safeguard requiring an officer to have reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity before stopping a motorist, but
provides no substitute to protect licensed motorists . . . from
repeated stops at the unchecked discretion of law enforcement
178
officers.”
Of course, the statute empowering conservation
officers to conduct a search in Colosimo arguably did impose such a
limit: it required conservation officers to have probable cause to
179
search.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court read this
limitation out of the statute, leaving anglers with nothing to protect
them from repeated searches at the unchecked discretion of
conservation officers.
The Henning court was concerned that permitting stops based
180
solely on the special series plates would subject innocent citizens
“to the possibility of numerous stops made each and every day” and
to the possibility “of being stopped by every law enforcement
181
officer they encounter.”
Anglers in the state of Minnesota, and
even non-anglers who happen to be in the area of fishing lakes, are
now subject to the possibility of being searched by every
conservation officer they encounter because the court in Colosimo
did not see fit to provide the protection for them that the court
provides motorists. The only reason to not provide this protection
was a perceived need to protect the natural resources of the state.
It is hard to understand how the need to protect fish is greater than
the need to protect human life, which was found insufficient to
overcome the privacy interests of motorists in Ascher and Henning.
The Colosimo court attempted to further support its decision by
pointing to the difficulty of finding probable cause that a fishing

177. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 383 (citing Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648, 65354 (1979)).
178. Id. at 385.
179. See MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b) (2000).
180. Even if the convicted offender was driving, he might be doing so lawfully
within the limits of a limited license, or a member of his household might lawfully
be driving the car with the special series plates.
181. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 384.
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violation occurred on a boat. The court found it unreasonable to
require an officer to track anglers’ “largely uninhibited freedom of
movement in remote areas in pursuit of our abundant fish
183
resources” in order to gain probable cause to inspect.
However,
the court failed to acknowledge that “difficulty” has never in the
past been a basis for overriding constitutional requirements of
individualized suspicion. In Henning, the court recognized that the
state has an obvious and substantial interest in safeguarding our
184
roads from drivers who repeatedly drive while impaired.
Nevertheless, when faced with the argument that the suspicionless
stops were necessary to protect this interest, the court answered:
“We have never before simply allowed the ends to justify the means
185
when the means void our citizens’ constitutional protections.”
Arguably, in Colosimo, the court has now done just that. In Henning,
the court went on to declare that permitting suspicionless stops
“would be a dramatic departure that demotes constitutional
186
protections to a position inferior to that of traffic safeguards.” In
Colosimo, the court has demoted constitutional protections to a
position inferior to that of fish and game regulations.
The Colosimo court, however, attempted to differentiate Ascher
from the case before it by again pointing to the level of intrusion.
The court stated that the intrusion suffered by Colosimo, whose boat
was already stopped when the officer began questioning him,
“[did] not raise similar concerns of a ‘roadblock’ addressed in
Ascher, where a large number of motor vehicles were stopped on
187
the public highways . . . .”
The court comfortably differentiated
between suspicionless searches of boats and stops of vehicles, which
require reasonable articulable suspicion, by focusing on the
“recreational privilege that anglers choose to engage in with
188
knowledge of the regulations governing their conduct.” But both
boats and vehicles are heavily regulated. Both require the use of
public property and those who operate both are granted the
“privilege” to do so by acquiring a license from the state.
182. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 6-8 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2017 (2004).
183. Id. at 8.
184. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 386.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 8 n.1 (citing Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519
N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994)).
188. Id. at 9.
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Moreover, like the fish house in Larsen, both boats and vehicles at
one time or another may be utilized to shield the occupants from
the elements and “provid[e] privacy for activities ‘recognized and
189
permitted by society.’”
The Colosimo court also took comfort in
190
But whether
the fact that it only authorized searches, not stops.
that limitation holds when the court is presented with a case raising
the issue of a stop by a conservation officer remains to be seen. In
any event, the court’s distinction will provide little comfort to
citizens if conservation officers may, as the court permitted in
Colosimo, take advantage of the situation whenever a citizen stops
his boat or vehicle in order to enter a lake.
John Colosimo was an innocent angler whose catch was in
strict accordance with all of the state’s regulations. Yet, despite
Colosimo’s innocence, he was punished for asserting his Fourth
Amendment rights against an officer who had no probable cause or
even a hint of suspicion that any fishing rules had been violated.
This is a violation of Colosimo’s constitutional rights, and is
contrary to Minnesota Statutes section 97A.215, subdivision 1(b),
which clearly states that an enforcement officer must have probable
cause that a game or fish law violation has occurred before the
191
officer enters or inspects any place or vehicle.
By finding John
Colosimo in violation, the court in essence said that a citizen
automobile driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her vehicle, while the boater who innocently spends a day on the
lake is left with no protection and is subject to the indiscriminate
whims of a conservation officer.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Henning, Larsen, and Ascher, the Minnesota Supreme Court
“took a firm stance in favor of the ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’
192
After Henning, commentators in this law review
standard.”
praised the court, stating “[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court’s firm
position that suspicionless stops of motorists are improper can be
cast in terms heard frequently at the United States Supreme Court
during Chief Justice Earl Warren’s reign: the ends do not justify the
189. State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Minn. v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).
190. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 8 n.1.
191. MINN. STAT. § 97A.215, subd. 1(b) (2000).
192. See Webb & Hanley, supra note 9, at 528 (referring to the court’s decision
in Henning).
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193

means.” That makes the court’s decision in Colosimo all the more
surprising because it turns directly against this “firm stance,” and,
in Justice Page’s words, “turns our court’s search and seizure law on
194
its head.”
With the court’s decision in Colosimo, Minnesota’s citizens may
now be criminally punished for refusing to submit to suspicionless
searches and seizures of their motor vehicles, boats, or the other
conveyances they use to typically store and transport fish. The
citizens of the State of Minnesota deserve better. The court’s
decision forces the state’s citizens to choose between their
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
their “privilege” to engage in the hunting and fishing sports for
which Minnesota is renowned.
It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari to address the question whether a conservation
officer is subject to the same rules and limitations as other law
enforcement. It is even more unfortunate that in the absence of a
ruling from the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, a court which has regularly provided citizens with
greater protection than required under the federal constitution,
has subjected the state’s anglers to the standardless and
unconstrained discretion of officers in the field which was
condemned in Delaware v. Prouse. With its decision in Colosimo, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has left Minnesota’s citizens
unprotected; any innocent angler, trapper, or hunter—or citizen
thought to be an angler, trapper, or hunter—is subject to a
demand to search at the whim of the state’s conservation officers
and may be criminally punished if they do not comply. As Justice
Page so eloquently stated in his dissent:
Rather than requiring the state to properly manage Minnesota’s
wildlife resources, the court has instead decided to grant the
state the power to compel the relinquishment of an individual’s
constitutional right not only to be free from unreasonable
searches, but also the freedom to assert one’s constitutional
195
right without fear of criminal punishment.

193.
194.
195.

Id. at 526.
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 13 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id. at 17–18.
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